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Efficacy of physical layer preamble
manipulation for IEEE 802.11a/ac
B. Ramsey✉, J. Fuller and C. Badenhop
Wireless physical layer manipulation is a recently discovered technique
for selective packet obfuscation. This process exploits the unique and
proprietary nature of transceiver designs rather than manufacturing
imperfections. To date, preamble manipulation has only successfully
been demonstrated on low data rate transceivers operating in the
2.4 GHz band. This Letter investigates the effectiveness of preamble
manipulation on common 5 GHz IEEE 802.11a and IEEE 802.11ac
wireless transceivers for the ﬁrst time. Herein it is demonstrated that
the preamble short training sequence length can be manipulated to
discern among the six transceiver designs under test with greater
than 99% accuracy using fewer than 20 packets.
Introduction: Wireless connectivity is a key enabler in mobile com-
munication systems. The IEEE 802.11ac high data rate standard
enables wireless data rates comparable with gigabit Ethernet, while
maintaining backward co-existence with IEEE 802.11a. Further reﬁne-
ments to IEEE 802.11ac systems are an active area of research [1, 2].
Unfortunately, wireless security continues to pose signiﬁcant chal-
lenges. Open source software tools to conduct MAC address spooﬁng,
deauthentication attacks, and encryption key cracking have become
ubiquitous [3]; these developments have spurred novel research into
leveraging the physical layer to improve wireless security in depth.
Device manufacturers produce unique and proprietary transceiver
designs; recent work reveals that these transceiver design idiosyncrasies
can be reliably exploited [4–7]. The true hardware class of remote trans-
ceivers is determined through the use of physical layer preamble
manipulation. Promising results have been demonstrated for 2.4 GHz
IEEE 802.11b [4] and IEEE 802.15.4 [5–7] transceivers. These novel
physical layer techniques exploit design idiosyncrasies present in all
like-model devices from the same manufacturer. For example, wireless
packets manipulated to have a physical layer preamble shorter than the
protocol speciﬁcation become unreceivable by some hardware designs,
while reception by other hardware designs remains unaffected.
Applications of this phenomenon are numerous, from obfuscated
encryption key distribution [5] and wireless intrusion detection system
evasion [6], to device ﬁngerprinting [4, 7]. Once implementation differ-
ences are discovered and published, they can be immediately leveraged
in conjunction with any of the millions of such devices worldwide.
This Letter presents the ﬁrst investigation of physical layer preamble
manipulation on high data rate IEEE 802.11a and IEEE 802.11ac
transceivers.
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Fig. 1 Magnitude plot of ﬁrst 16 µs of standard IEEE 802.11a physical layer
preamble as received by USRP X310
PHY preambles in 802.11a and 802.11ac: The IEEE 802.11ac standard
utilises increased spectral bandwidth and improved modulation schemes
to increase its effective data rate beyond the earlier IEEE 802.11a
protocol. However, since IEEE 802.11ac must still share the 5 GHz
band with legacy devices, benign coexistence is important. The solution
utilised is a preamble common to both protocols for clear channel
assessment.
Preambles begin with a short training ﬁeld (STF), immediately fol-
lowed by a long training ﬁeld (LTF). Each ﬁeld is 8 µs long, for a com-
bined STF and LTF duration of 16 µs. Fig. 1 presents a representative
magnitude plot of the STF and LTF regions as collected by a USRP
X310 software-deﬁned radio. The background noise ﬂoor appears at
the left-hand side edge of the plot and the transmission progresses
through time from left- to right-hand side.
Experiment methodology: This experiment is designed to address the
question of how preamble manipulations affect wireless packet reception
by IEEE 802.11a and IEEE 802.11ac transceivers. This question is
addressed by transmitting wireless packets with speciﬁc manipulations
made to their preambles to six different transceiver types and observing
the percentage of reception for each manipulation on each transceiver.
Table 1 lists the six transceiver designs under test and their corresponding
device IDs (used for the remainder of this Letter). All six designs support
IEEE 802.11a, while Dev1, Dev2, and Dev3 also support IEEE 802.11ac.
Table 1: Six transceiver designs under test and device ID nomikers
Device ID Adapter type Transceiver
Dev1 Linksys AE6000 MT7610U
Dev2 ASUS USB-AC53 BCM43526
Dev3 TP-LINK T4U RTL8812AU
Dev4 Intel PRO 3945ABG W62534RDE
Dev5 Cisco AIR-CB21AG-A-K9 AR5212
Dev6 Linksys WPC600N BCM4328
Multiple channels are available for IEEE 802.11a and IEEE 802.11ac
transmissions in the 5 GHz band. IEEE 802.11a transmitters always use
20 MHz wide channels, while IEEE 802.11ac can use 40, 80, or
(optional) 160 MHz wide channels. For this experiment the centre fre-
quency for IEEE 802.11a tests is 5785 MHz and the centre frequency
for the separate IEEE 802.11ac tests is 5795 MHz. Experiments involv-
ing IEEE 802.11ac are conducted using a 40 MHz conﬁguration to make
a clear distinction from IEEE 802.11a, while also being accessible to the
CBX-40 daughterboard in the USRP X310 software-deﬁned radio.
Experiment system conﬁguration: The logical topology of the exper-
iment setup is illustrated in Fig. 2. The access point is a Linksys WRT
1900AC, the laptop is a DELL Precision M4500, and the Desktop PC
is a Dell Precision T7500 with 24 GB of RAM. The USRP X310 is con-
trolled via GNURadio on the Desktop PC, connected by a 10GBase SFP
+ cable. A RAMdrive is conﬁgured on the Desktop PC such that in phase
and quadrature (I/Q) data streams from theDesktop PC to theUSRPX310
without being read from a hard disk drive.Wireless packets with manipu-
lated PHYpreambles are transmitted from theUSRPX310 to the transcei-
vers under test, connected one at a time to the Laptop. The transceivers
under test are wirelessly associated to the access point using the appropri-
ate centre frequency and spectral bandwidth during each test.
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Fig. 2 Logical topology of experiment equipment
Data collection procedure: Each of the six transceiver designs in Table 1
are investigated individually. Once the transceiver under test is associated to
the access point, 300 Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) echo
requests with standard (non-manipulated) PHY preambles are transmitted
from the USRP X310 to the transceiver at a rate of one per second.
Percentage of packet reception is monitored using Wireshark on the
Laptop. Once 100% packet reception is conﬁrmed for standard packets,
the preamble manipulation experiment begins. The 100% packet reception
baseline is subsequently reconﬁrmed between each test to ensure that
extraneous wireless interference is not a confounding inﬂuence.
For each of the preamble manipulations investigated, 300 ICMP echo
requests with the given PHY manipulation are transmitted to the trans-
ceiver under test and the percentage of packet reception is monitored
using Wireshark. The STF is shortened or lengthened by up to ﬁve
symbols from the standard length of 10 (length∈ {5, 6, …, 15})
while the LTF remains standard. All tests are conducted at both high
and low received signal strength conditions to investigate the consist-
ency of the results across the operational range of the transceivers.
The physical distances between the laptop and USRP transmitter in
Fig. 2 are 1 m (−28 dBm) and 38 m (−78 dBm), respectively. Even
with a standard PHY, packet reception falls below 100% at distances
beyond 38 m, causing intermittent network connectivity loss.
Therefore, a maximum distance of 38 m is chosen for the experiment.
Observations of STF manipulation in IEEE 802.11a and IEEE
802.11ac: Tables 2 and 3 report reception rates for the six transceivers
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under test while operating in IEEE 802.11a mode. Short STFs are exam-
ined in Table 2, long STFs are examined in Table 3, and the baseline
standard length STF (l = 10) appears in both. Notably, the observed
packet reception rates at −28 dBm and −78 dBm are statistically indis-
tinguishable (99% CI, n = 300) for all scenarios examined. This is strong
evidence for transceiver response consistency throughout the oper-
ational range of the devices. It is also clear from Tables 2 and 3 that
the reception differences among the six devices are sufﬁciently distinct
as to be useful for message obfuscation and device ﬁngerprinting. For
example, only half of the devices (Dev1, Dev4 and Dev5) can receive
packets with a longer-than-standard STF of l = 14. Results are identical
for Dev1, Dev2 and Dev3 operating in IEEE 802.11ac mode.
Table 2: Packet reception rates (n = 300) versus STF length
(length∈ {5, 6, …, 10}) for the transceivers while oper-
ating in IEEE 802.11a mode. Dashes represent zero
reception, for visual emphasis
dBm l = 5, % l = 6, % l = 7, % l = 8, % l = 9, % l = 10, %
Dev1 −28 – – – – – 100
−78 – – – – – 100
Dev2 −28 100 100 100 100 100 100
−78 100 100 100 100 100 100
Dev3 −28 – – – – 100 100
−78 – – – – 100 100
Dev4 −28 16 21 31 68 80 100
−78 8 17 32 72 72 100
Dev5 −28 – – 100 100 100 100
−78 – – 100 100 100 100
Dev6 −28 100 100 100 100 100 100
−78 100 100 100 100 100 100
Table 3: Packet reception rates (n = 300) versus STF length
(length∈ {10, 11, …, 15}) for the transceivers while
operating in IEEE 802.11a mode. Dashes represent zero
reception, for visual emphasis
dBm l = 10, % l = 11, % l = 12, % l = 13, % l = 14, % l = 15, %
Dev1 −28 100 100 100 100 100 100
−78 100 100 100 100 100 100
Dev2 −28 100 100 100 100 – –
−78 100 100 100 100 – –
Dev3 −28 100 100 – – – –
−78 100 100 – – – –
Dev4 −28 100 100 100 100 88 70
−78 100 100 100 100 80 60
Dev5 −28 100 100 100 100 100 –
−78 100 100 100 100 100 –
Dev6 −28 100 100 100 – – –
−78 100 100 100 – – –
Transceiver ﬁngerprinting proof of concept: In this scenario, the inves-
tigator can be a network auditor or an attacker. The investigator is
unaware of the type of the transceiver within a wireless device operating
in IEEE 802.11a or IEEE 802.11ac mode. By transmitting acknowledg-
ment requests (e.g. ICMP echo requests) with varying preamble lengths,
the pattern of replies and non-replies allows the investigator to accu-
rately identify the unknown or unveriﬁed transceiver.
The classiﬁcation decision tree in Fig. 3 is a proof-of-concept modelled
after those in [4], for IEEE 802.11b, and [7], for IEEE 802.15.4. The tree is
designed using fewest states (STF length) such that the number of required
test packets at each step (n) is minimised. Furthermore, the probability of
correctly identifying Dev4 (which requires observing a response during
each of three steps) exceeds 99% (P = 99.26%).
The algorithm begins with the successful reception of an acknowledg-
ment reply (standard PHY) from the device under test.Next, up to four test
packets are transmitted to the device under test. Once a reply is observed
in response to a PHY manipulated test packet, additional test packets at
that decision step in the tree are not necessary. If a reply is observed in
response to every test packet (following initial contact), the investigator
determines the transceiver under test to be of type Dev4 (W62534RDE)
using only three packets. Similarly, if all test packets after the initial
response test go unanswered, the investigator can posit that the transceiver
under test is of type Dev3 (RTL8812 AU) with six packets (4 + 1 + 1
tries). This algorithm can be extended and improved as response patterns
fromadditional transceiver designs are revealed. The onlymodiﬁcation to
Fig. 3 required for high packet loss scenarios is an arbitrarily greater
number of tries at each decision step.
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Fig. 3 Example classiﬁcation decision tree for IEEE 802.11a/ac transceivers
Conclusion: The burgeoning research ﬁeld of physical layer protocol
manipulation leverages discoveries made about transceiver design
idiosyncrasies. This Letter presents the ﬁrst investigation of PHY manipu-
lation on high data rate IEEE 802.11a and IEEE 802.11ac transceiver
designs commonly found worldwide. It is discovered that the preamble
STF length can be manipulated to discern among the six transceiver
designs under test with greater than 99% accuracy. Design idiosyncra-
sies of real-world hardware cannot be determined through mathematical
modelling or network simulation. Therefore, experiments must be
conducted with as many transceiver and protocol designs as possible.
Future work will explore additional technologies, from Z-Wave and
Bluetooth low energy, to satellite communication protocols.
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